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Informal institutions like kinship based networks play a crucial role in business activity. 
The flow of information in such networks, based on trust and reciprocity helps in creating an 
environment where opportunism is curtailed and relational based governance mechanism 
prevails. This paper studies, whether such factors play a role as an alternative governance 
mechanism for contracts as opposed to the formal institutions or not. The effectiveness of such 
network factors hinges on the network structure, and therefore network density and network 
size are taken as independent variables. Though network density was positively and 
significantly related to the use of social networks for management of breach of contracts, 
network size was negatively related to management of breach of contracts. Network size and 
network density were positively related to ex-post transaction costs of dispute resolutions 
however, they were not statistically significant.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Academics have paid great attention to the relationship between entrepreneurship 
and social capital. However, social capital is a multidimensional term and encompasses 
many concepts under its umbrella. Various academic disciplines use social capital and 
multiple tools and techniques which are present in academic literature for its 
conceptualisation and measurement. Academic work which focuses on firm 
embeddedness and social capital is dominated by studies from the developed economies, 
where the data on social capital is collected from various databases. Such studies on 
developing or underdeveloped economies are limited. This study would contribute to the 
existing knowledge on this subject and would attempt to quantify the social capital of 
entrepreneurs through measurements of various dimensions of their social network.  
In contemporary literature, we often find social networking facilities and social 
networks being used interchangeably. However, our understanding of social networks is 
exclusively the relationships and ties that an individual is connected to rather than the 
social networking facilities. This social network can be facilitated through various means 
including web based activities but that is not a focus of this paper.   
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An important function of social networks for entrepreneurs among many others is 
their ability to reduce transaction costs. In developing countries the formal institutional 
arrangements for conflict resolution are not very reliable which leads to a great 
dependence on informal mechanisms for honouring contracts [Khan (2011); Nicholas and 
Maitland (2007)]. This situation arises because either means of contract enforcement are 
completely ignored by the state, or are too costly to enforce. The option left to the 
businesses is to rely on alternate means of contract enforcements in such situations. 
Contracts can be made binding with the help of trust and reciprocity among members of 
the society [Nicholas and Maitland (2007)]. 
Small and medium sized enterprises (henceforth SMEs) in power loom textile 
weaving sector in Pakistan are the focus of this paper.  Cotton weaving is the largest 
sector within the total SMEs operating in the country with a share of nearly 20 percent. 
Pakistan‘s Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority (SMEDA) recently 
estimated that 95 percent of private enterprises in the industrial sector employ less than 
100 employees.
12
 These firms employ approximately 78 percent of the non-agricultural 
labour force in Pakistan and contribute over 30 percent to Pakistan‘s GDP and 25 percent 
of the country‘s exports of manufactured goods. This sector caters to both the domestic 
demand of fabric as well as makes low end use grey fabric for exports.  
The major contribution and source of information of the study has been the 
collection of primary data which was collected through a questionnaire and also through 
informal interviews with the respondents. Despite a great number of studies being 
available on the social capital and entrepreneurship, very few of them focus on the 
developing countries. This study generates its significance from the fact is that it has 
contributed to the scant literature on the relationship of social capital and 
entrepreneurship in the developing countries. It is a micro-level study which utilises 
primary data gathered through a questionnaire which adds to the meticulousness and 
reliability of the results produced from the study. Moreover, it has tried to map the social 
networks of entrepreneurs in Pakistan in the weaving sector which is a unique attempt 
through primary data gathering.  
The study of the role social networks in reduction of transaction costs for 
businesses opens up the door for further research in the theory of firm, and the role of 
social networks as an effective conduit for knowledge transfer and information sharing 
for firms.  
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Studies under the network theory literature provide great understanding of the 
institutional environment of the entrepreneurs and the social capital of entrepreneurs. 
Studies of entrepreneurship that acknowledge social capital as a crucial asset of 
entrepreneurs, seconds institutional economics theory that entrepreneurs, like any 
economic agent are not isolated from society unlike the assumption in orthodox 
economics. Entrepreneurs are nested in their relationships and affected by their 
environment and their social capital actually acts as an asset just like physical capital. To 
gain understanding of the impact of these relationships on economic activities, we 
 
1There is no uniform definition of the SME in the country and every organisation defines them 
according to its functional requirements.  
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consider it critical to study the social network, or in other words, the set of ties and 
relationships that an entrepreneur has. The work of Aldrich and Zimmer (1986) clearly 
mentions the social aspects of businesses and the role of such interactions in contributing 
to learning in firms. Varied academic disciplines provide insights to study of 
entrepreneurial networks. Despite such diversity in the academic roots of such studies, all 
tend to agree to the benefits of such networks for businesses. The answer to the basic 
question of why networking is important for entrepreneurs varies according to the 
academic discipline from which such study originated. These studies give various 
explanations of why networks are formed, governed and the nature of such contents that 
are exchanged in networks. In the following section, an overview of the theoretical and 
empirical work is presented which provides understanding of the role of the networks in 
entrepreneurial process. This overview would lead to development of the conceptual 
framework later on.  
The first section examines classical works on the theories of social capital, 
networks and firms. Later on, we zoom in into the current research that has a timeline of 
the present decade. Last section develops a conceptual framework.  
Many scholars have studied the role of social capital and networking for 
entrepreneurs from various perspectives like transaction costs approach [Coase (1984); 
Williamson (1979, 1996); Salancik and Pfeffer (1978); Zucker (1987)]. The social 
network approach has been widely used to understand the benefits of social networking 
to entrepreneurs from a sociological perspective [Birley, et al. (1991); Granovetter (1983, 
1985, 2000, 2005);  Johannisson (1988); Ostgaard and Birley (1996); Uzzi (1996, 1997)]. 
Transaction cost approach analyses firm networking from an economic point of 
view. The social network analysis explains networking from a sociological point of view.  
In this section, the study briefly highlights the theoretical understanding of these 
approaches to networking. Our major objective is to document all the relevant academic 
work that has taken place in these disciplines to create foundations for the conceptual 
framework of this paper. 
Transaction cost theory has been widely used to explain the reason for networking 
among businesses [Williamson (1979)]. A transaction means a transfer of a good or a 
service between technologically separable interfaces [Williamson (1979, 1996)].  Thus, 
the transaction costs simply means all costs involved in a transfer of goods and services 
from one unit to another. The characteristics of transactions are: they are always asset 
specific, in small numbers, and uncertainty and bargaining are always involved. 
Transactions become costly because of these characteristics. Reduction of these costs 
leads firms to either vertically integrate or to search for substitutes to the market. 
[Williamson (1979, 1996)].  
In the studies of joint ventures in developing countries, Kogut (1997), argues that 
higher levels of trust in informal networks reduces transaction costs for entrepreneurs.  
Trust works in two ways: it reduces the time and costs of negotiation and bargaining and 
reduces uncertainty associated with transactions [Minniti and Bygrave (2001); Uzzi 
(1996)]. Thus the transaction cost approach to entrepreneurial networks gives a good 
theoretical background to the understanding of social capital and its relationship to 
business activity. The limitation of this approach is that it does not give empirical insights 
on the subject.  
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The studies which empirically capture the dimension of social capital are found in 
the social network analysis approach.  The social network analysis approach views 
business transactions in the light of the social relationships that exist between two people.  
The social network analysis approach to entrepreneurship relies on two principles:  
first, gathering of resources from external sources is a component of the entrepreneurial 
process. These resources are not limited to capital only but also include abstract concepts 
like ideas, knowledge, advice and moral and emotional support. Secondly, to get access 
to these resources, the entrepreneurs seek the contribution of his social network. So, the 
social network becomes a source of provision of resources necessary for the 
entrepreneurial network.  
According to the social network approach, every individual has social ties and 
these social ties are vital for the entrepreneurial process [Aldrich and Zimmer (1986); 
Birley, et al. (1991); Johannisson (1988); Ostgaard and Birley (1996)]. One of the critical 
aspects of a social network is its ability to provide information to the entrepreneur which 
is available without effort and cost. Such information is available through existing friends  
[Aldrich and Zimmer (1986); Birley (1986); Birley, et al. (1991)] and family members 
[Özcan (1995)] particularly in developing countries.  Another feature of social network is 
the provision of financial support [Aldrich and Zimmer (1986); Özcan (1995)].  
Information and resource sharing and collectively working out solution of problems are 
some benefits of social ties [Uzzi (1996)].  These benefits accrue because of the social 
network according to the social network theory. In the words of Uzzi (1996, 1997), 
embeddedness of social ties is,  ―the degree to which commercial transactions take place 
through social relations and  networks of relations that use exchange protocols associated 
with social, non-commercial  attachments to govern business dealings‖. Authors like 
Granovetter  (1985), consider social networks to act as a cushion for entrepreneurs against 
distrust and uncertain situations. Social ties help in creation of opportunities for new business 
ideas and innovations too since they encourage entrepreneurs to take risks for innovation 
under uncertain conditions [Gulati (1995); Gulati and Gargiulo (1999)]. In other words, social 
networks help in the reduction of transaction costs. 
Inkpen and Tsang (2005) have studied the role of social capital to analyse the 
transfer of knowledge among network members. The have defined three dimensions of 
social capital namely, structural, cognitive, and relational. All these three aspects of 
social capital affect knowledge transfer [Inkpen and Tsang (2005)]. This study sets the 
stage for developing further investigation for understanding the role of networks in 
disseminating knowledge.  
Another significant study from Zhou and Poppo (2010), suggests that legal 
enforceability increases the use of contract over relational reliability. In other words, 
relational enforceability of contracts is important when legal enforcement is weak. Using 
a survey results of 399 buyer–supplier exchanges in China, the study makes important 
conclusions that: (1) explicit contracts are used more rather than relational 
trustworthiness when legal system is strong (i.e., asset specificity, environmental 
uncertainty, and behavioural uncertainty); and (2) on the other hand, if legal system is 
weak, then relational trustworthiness plays central role in contract enforcement for 
protection of transactions. These results endorse that under conditions of greater legal 
enforceability, the use of relational reliability would become unimportant and vice versa.  
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Morales and Fernandez (2010) introduce some specific insights regarding social 
networks of firms in order to investigate factors involved in innovation. This study 
compares a sample of 220 manufacturing firms in the Valencia Region (Spain). The 
conclusions from the study were that there was a positive relationship between social 
capital, that is trust and shared ideas, and involvement of local institutions with 
innovation in firms of the region [Molina‐Morales and Martínez‐Fernández (2010)].  
Findings from a survey of 241 Chinese firms indicated that business ties affect 
performance more than political ties, and both effects depend on institutional and market 
environments. Key conclusions from the study are that when legal enforcement is 
ineffective and technology is rapidly changing, business ties become more useful than 
political ties [Sheng, et al. (2011)].  
Zhou, et al. (2012) add to the existing knowledge on the ongoing debate whether 
economic and social governance mechanisms function as substitutes or complements 
regarding inter firm transactions. Based on a sample of 168 foreign buyer–local supplier 
exchanges in China, the study finds that relational governance complements written 
contracts but acts as a substitute to control opportunism. When formal law enforcement is 
weak, relational governance provides a proxy for legal institutions for compliance of 
contracts.  
Feigenberg, et al. (2013), suggested that the risk of default and timely loan 
repayments among microfinance clients dropped as the interaction among the recipients 
increased.  In their long-run survey data and results of follow-up experiment reveals the 
economic returns to social interaction, and provides insights in to causes of the reduction 
of transaction costs in the collective lending model.  
In a macro level study by Turkina and Thai (2013), three social capital factors—
networking, interpersonal trust, and institutional trust—provide an explanation for 
variations in immigrant entrepreneurship across countries. Social capital plays a 
significant role in high-value added immigrant entrepreneurship in particular and 
immigrant entrepreneurship in general [Turkina and Thai (2013)].  
In a specific case of the knowledge economy, Westlund, et al. (2014), reiterate the 
value of social capital for firms for benefitting from local systems of innovation. 
Proximity and network connections make it possible for firms to reduce transaction costs 
and exchange information smoothly specially when the interaction takes place in a 
knowledge economy rather than manufacturing based economy.  
Some particular studies on developing countries further establish the important 
role of social capital for business performance. A study on women owned businesses in 
Tanzania by Tundui and Tundui (2013) found that apart from human and physical capital, 
higher levels of social capital among entrepreneurs was a major contributor to higher 
profits. Moreover, it was the bridging social capital which was most useful for business 
performance. Moreover, the role of personal networks as conduits of information has 
been studied extensively by various authors across various countries. In developing 
countries, social networks help specifically in spreading information about technology. 
Studies such as Munshi (2014) illustrate in great detail that for the developing countries, 
the importance of social capital is manifold. Not only does it act as an alternative social 
safety net in the absence of institutional support, social networks also work as conduits of 
information flows and developing a sense of peer monitoring which leads to success of 
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many self-governed community development initiatives. Banerjee, et al. (2013) have 
further illustrated this line of thought using field experiments from the microfinance 
lending programs in Peru. Their study demonstrated that it was the peer pressure which 
acted a significant incentive to the motivation of timely repayments. A similar study in 
another developing country substantiates the works of Banerjee, et al. (2013) that peer 
pressure acts as an enforcement mechanism in lending programs in Philippines. When 
loans are given to recipients along with a co-signer who is known to the recipient, the 
loan repayment is timely [Gine and Karlan (2008)]. Another example of the strong 
enforcement effects can be seen in the field experiment study on consumer credit in 
South Africa by Bryan, et al. (2012) there referrals from trustworthy people played a key 
role in advancing consumer loans. Heath (2011) has studied the reduction in information 
asymmetries in the context of Bangladeshi garment industry. She explains that employers 
take advantage of the enforcement capability of social networks. The enforcement 
mechanism is used as a technique to reduce moral hazard by punishing the referrers and 
the referred employee for low output.  
This review provides us with insights into the subject of entrepreneurial networks 
and we see that the theme of social networks appears frequently in the context of 
entrepreneurial networks. While this review might not be exhaustive, it does establish 
that the presence of such networks has been acknowledged and studied in the existing 
body of literature. Existing studies have all defined social networks as informal ties and 
relationships with one‘s family, friends and acquaintances and the same definition would 
be followed in this paper as well.  
 
2.1. Conceptual Framework 
After defining the role of networks for reduction in transaction costs, what still 
remains to be answered is the role of various network characteristics in transaction cost 
reduction. As was discussed earlier, social ties can either be dense or sparse. An 
important aspect of contribution of social capital to entrepreneurial research is the 
dynamic of social structures. Network structure is defined as the pattern of direct and 
indirect ties between actors.  Variety of measures drawn from the network analysis 
literature explains how social network attributes affect knowledge flows and impact 
entrepreneurial process. Network size is the most straightforward measure, defined as the 
number of direct links between a focal actor and other actors. Analyses of network size 
measures the extent to an entrepreneurs receives various resources [Aldrich, et al. (1989); 
Aldrich and Zimmer (1986)]. 
The access to diverse information however, is better explained by the network 
structure in terms of strength of social ties. Granovetter‘s (1973) notion of weak ties, 
explains how diverse resources can be accessed in terms of new ideas which lie outside 
the immediate social circle of an individual. A similar, complementary concept is 
bridging social capital in the form of structural holes or absence of ties. According to 
[Burt (1997a)], such unconnected ties bring in information which would otherwise not be 
accessible by the entrepreneurs if he remains within a closed social group.  Such bridging 
social capital not only diversifies the sources of information but also provides 
opportunities to influence other networks with whom the entrepreneur is not directly 
connected to [Krackhardt (1995)]. Due to access to novel information as a result of 
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bridging ties, firms can improve performance [Zaheer and McEvily (1999); Zaheer, et al. 
(1998)]. 
Another aspect of network structure is the density of contacts of the social 
network. A network can have few loose connections or a tightly knit set of ties where all 
contacts know each other. Loose contacts are sparse networks and tightly knit 
connections are dense networks. Density is measured by the extent to which an actor‘s 
contacts are interconnected. Certain actors may be better connected and hence have a 
competitive advantage over those who are poorly connected. Burt (1997a) and Coleman 
(1988) present opposing views on the density of networks and its usefulness. Coleman 
(1988) notes that a densely knit group of actors or dense networks have higher social 
capital and therefore have an advantage over those groups of actors who are poorly 
connected. On the other hand, Burt (1997a, 1997b) argues that sparse social networks, 
implying that the actors have few connections between them, are more beneficial. He 
says that such networks bring greater access to new information about resources and 
opportunities. This happens because of the uneven spread of information. According to 
Burt, dense network would bring in redundant information. Structural holes bring in no 
redundant information and within this non-redundant information are opportunities which 
can be turned into profits. Therefore, according to this stream of thought, structural holes, 
instead of dense networks give more competitive advantage. However, the theory is silent 
on the role of networks as governance mechanism. Through reputational effects, 
transaction costs might be lowered, but in presence of structural holes, the peer pressure 
effect might be non-existent.  
Another characteristic of networks is the strength of ties among network members. 
Stronger ties will enhance the feelings of reciprocity and trust towards group members. 
The source of strength in relationships depends upon various factors. For this paper, we 
have used frequency of contact, duration of relationship and entry in the network as 
factors which determine the strength of relationship among group members. Longer 
duration and frequent meetings help in building the bonds between group members and 
also the likelihood of sharing more information. The entry into one‘s network is the first 
block of trust in any relationship. If someone is a distant family member or related to 
another family member or belongs to same caste/biraderi, it adds more weight to the 
strength of the relationship.  
 
2.1.1. Networks as Alternative Governance Mechanism 
Small firms, unlike the large enterprises, do not have enough resources at their 
disposal to counter transaction costs since they are inherently resource starved. This 
situation makes the need for networking even more important for smaller firms. As 
Williamson has argued that the economic functions can be performed within the 
boundaries of hierarchical firms, or by the market processes. But for small firms, both 
options are not viable especially in developing countries.   Networking is one of the best 
solutions given in the literature for the development of small firms in developing 
countries because networking lies between the hierarchy and the market [Nicholas and 
Maitland (2007)]. Small firms have to obtain resources from external actors.  In literature 
review in previous sections, it is seen that the network relationships have many benefits 
for the firms.  For smaller firms, their social ties are vital for their survival and due to 
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their embeddedness in their social environment, the high level of trust plays an important 
role. As transaction cost theory has suggested that transaction costs are too high for small 
enterprises, the social network theory has provided a solution to the reduction of 
transaction costs by analysing the mediating role of social networks for business related 
costs. Costs of enforcement and monitoring of contracts, instead of being enforced 
through legal methods are curtailed by the fear of peer pressure and the risk of loss of 
reputation in the social networks. Thus, social networks act as an alternative governance 
mechanism to formal procedures of reduction in transaction costs. The figure below 
reflects these thoughts in a concise manner.  
 
Fig. 3.1.Conceptual Framework for Relationship of Network Attributes  
and Transaction Costs 
 
 
The integrated conceptual framework takes into account all these aspects of 
networks. Our study setting provides a good opportunity to analyse these elements within 
social networks of entrepreneurs because on one hand, as a typical case of a developing 
country, the formal institutional mechanisms are weak, expensive and time consuming 
which presents greater likelihood of very high transaction costs but on the other hand the 
social structure and informal ties play a very crucial role in the everyday business life in 
Pakistan and therefore there is a greater likelihood of relying on informal means for 
minimising transaction costs.  
In line with the earlier discussion on network literature, this paper proposes that:  
in the presence of a dense set of relationships, the transaction costs would be lowered for 
small businesses. As suggested in the studies in the earlier sections, dense networks can 
be sources of information and also a form of peer pressure. Therefore, in the presence of 
such networks, transaction costs associated with monitoring and enforcement of contracts 
would be lowered. 
 
2.2. Hypothesis of the Study  
(i) A dense social network lowers ex-post transaction costs of contract 
enforcement. 
(ii) A dense social network lowers ex- post transaction costs of dispute resolution. 
(iii) Stronger Ties lower ex-post transaction costs of contract enforcement. 
(iv) Stronger Ties lower ex-post transaction costs of dispute resolution. 
Network density, Strong 
Ties & network size 
Leads to  
Peer pressure, reputation effects, information, 
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3. DATA, METHODS AND ESTIMATION OF THE MODELS 
In the case of SMEs, there were two problems: firstly, SMEs are still not properly 
defined in the country and every government department and financial institution uses its 
own definition according to its operations. The power loom sector which is the focus of 
this study is under the non-mill or informal sector and therefore government databases 
have only some vague idea about their exact numbers [Khan (2011); Memon (2011); 
Pakistan (2009, 2014); SMEDA (2007); Pakistan (2013)].  The SMEs data base in 
Pakistan is very fragile and unreliable due to regular change of survey units definitions, 
partial sector wise coverage with bias to manufacturing, too aggregative nature of the 
data, non-continuity of surveys, non-compilation of data on important aspects such as 
overall and sector wise [Dasanayaka (2011)]. The most reliable data bases available with 
government are the three statistical bureaus (now these three bodies amalgamated). But 
that also do not specifically give exact contribution of SMEs alone.  Therefore, we could 
not use make use of available data sources from various department due to lack of 
consistency and unavailability of official data on power loom sector [Dasanayaka (2009, 
2011)]. 
The location of data collection was the city of Faisalabad in the province of Punjab 
in Pakistan. Since minimal relevant secondary information is available on power loom 
weavers [Khan (2011)], we consulted some key organisations for identifying firms.  
Initially, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority (SMEDA) was 
contacted. There are two business associations of the power loom weavers. We consulted 
the All Pakistan Power Loom Association for information about weavers and creating 
contact.  
 
3.1. Method and Variables 
The study is cross sectional in nature, embarking on an exploratory study to gather 
information on social networks of the entrepreneurs and its use as an alternative 
governance mechanism. In line with all the existing literature and best practices on 
similar subject, a primary data collection was done to obtain required information 
[Babbie (2013); Burt, Kilduff, and Tasselli (2013); De Lange, et al. (2004); 
Haythornthwaite (1996)]. A social network questionnaire was prepared and quantitative 
data was collected using a set of questions regarding various aspects of entrepreneur‘s 
operation and details of his social network. At first the questionnaire was tested and 
revised later on.  
The weaving segment firms are all in the unorganised, non-mill sector and there is 
no accurate data available on them regarding exact number of firms. The most widely 
used measure for firms is their productive capacity in terms of number of loom. We chose 
only those units which were identified with the help of the Pakistan Power Looms 
Association, SMEDA, and the small industries departments.
23
 We collected data from 
hundred and twelve entrepreneurs from Faisalabad.   
 
2SMEDA and Small Industries Departments are vital in locating entrepreneurs for our study. These two 
government organisations are responsible for maintaining and collecting statistics on SMEs in the country. 
Policy formulation pertaining to all affairs of the SMEs is through these two government departments. 
Therefore, their help in identification of the entrepreneurs of power loom sector was reliable and saved time and 
efforts for the field research.  
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 Independent Variables: Network Variables 
The variables used in this study are network size and network density. Network 
size is taken as the total number of alters the entrepreneur is connected to. It is measured 
by simply counting the unique relationships or alters of the entrepreneur. Network 
density measures the presence of structural holes in the network or in other words, it 
measures the connectedness of the ego‘s ties among each other. A value of one indicates 
maximum density and zero means none of the contacts know each other. Tie strength is a 
measure of strength of relationship among network members. Tie strength measures the 
strength of relationship with each individual identified by the ego. Frequency of contact, 
duration of relationship and entry into the network determine the strength of relationship 
with each individual.  
The date for these variables was collected through the social network questionnaire 
and the variables were calculated using the UCiNet software.  
 
 Dependent Variable: Transaction Costs 
In light of the existing literature and gathering from the discussions of the 
entrepreneurs, the following were the most important transaction costs identified and 
therefore to operationalise these thoughts, we created proxy variables on that information 
to measure them.  
 
(1) Contract Enforcement Costs 
Respondents were asked to answer the question and what do they do in case of 
non-compliance with contracts.  
 
(2) Dispute Resolution 
Respondents were asked question regarding the role of their networks for dispute 
resolution. They were asked to choose the possible method of handling business disputes.  
For both variables, the respondents were given options whether they chose formal 
dispute resolution mechanisms like legal action or contacted the police etc., or used their 
social network for mediation and resolution. If the respondent chose the social network 
for dealing with transaction costs, the response was given a value of 1 and 0 otherwise.  
 
3.2. Estimation of Model 
Two models have been presented in this paper for testing of statistical hypothesis. 
At first a Linear Probability Model (LPM) was constructed which tested all the 
hypotheses. A linear regression model with a dependent variable that is either 0 or 1 is 
called the Linear Probability Model, or LPM. The LPM predicts the probability of an 
event occurring, and, like other linear models, says that the effects of X‘s on the 
probabilities are linear. However, LPM comes with certain restrictions [Gujarati (2012); 
Maddala and Lahiri (1992)]. Some of the limitations of LPM are presence of 
hetrosecdasticity, possible violation of linearity assumption and error terms which are not 
normally distributed [Gujarati (2012)]. However, before the advent of computer 
applications, which have made calculating binary response models very easy, the LPM 
was widely used due to its simplicity [Gujarati (2012)]. The following sections present 
both types of models.  
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3.2.1. Linear Probability Models 
 
Management of Breach of Contract and Network Variables 
Dependent Variable = Management of breach of contract through social network 
Variable Coefficients t-statistic Prob. 
Constant –0.371 –2.41 .017 
Network Density 1.171 10.35 .000 
Network Size –.001 –0.009 .992 
Tie Strength 0.46 2.32 0.02 
R Square = 0.5 
 
The first hypothesis about significance of network density in cases of breach of 
contract also finds support in LMP model. Network density is positively and significantly 
related to breach of contract situations (b= 1.127, p < 0.1). However, there appears to be a 
negative relationship between network size and use of network in cases of breach of 
contract. This relationship however, is not statistically significant in the model. The 
model explains 50 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. 
 
Dispute Resolution and Network Variables 
Dependent Variable= Management of dispute resolution through social network 
Variable Coefficients t-statistic Sig. 
Constant –0.37 –2.41 0.01 
Network Density 1.17 10.35 0.00 
Network Size –0.001 –0.009 .99 
Tie Strength 0.46 2.32 0.02 
R Square = 0.50 
 
The second hypothesis was related to dispute resolution and network density. In 
the LMP regression model, though use of network for resolution in cases of disputes was 
positive in the presence of higher density of network, it was not statistically significant 
(b= 1.17, p<.01). The model explains 50 percent of the variance in the dependent 
variable. 
 
3.2.2. Binary Logistic Models 
 
Management of Breach of Contract and Network Variables 
Dependent Variable = Management of breach of contracts through social networks 
Variable Coefficients Z-Statistic Prob. 
Constant –3.39 –4.29 .000 
Network Density 4.29 6.58 .000 
Network Size 0.01 0.33 .736 
Tie Strength 1.85 2.02 .043 
McFadden R Square=0.448 
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Network size was not statistically significant to our model suggesting that a mere 
presence of a social network does not imply that the network would also be utilised for 
overcoming transaction costs. The other two variables about network characteristics 
throw more light on the role of social networks as alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Both network density and tie strength are significantly and positively linked 
to the dependent variable and thus the hypothesis finds support in the statistical model. 
Denser networks and stronger ties among network members encourage the use of social 
networks for overcoming transactions.  
The Pseudo R square used in the model is McFadden R square which is a popular 
choice among econometricians. A McFadden value between 0.2-0.4 is highly desirable 
and considered a good fit. The McFadden value for our model is 0.44 which suggests that 
the model is a good fit.   
 
Dispute Resolution and Network Variables 
Dependent Variable= Management of dispute resolution through social network 
Variable Coefficients Z-Statistic Prob. 
Constant –3.39 –4.29 0.000 
Network Density 4.29 6.58 0.000 
Network Size 0.02 0.33 0.736 
Tie Strength 1.85 2.02 0.042 
McFadden R Square= 0.45 
 
The dependant variable was positively related to network density and statistically 
significant. Tie strength is also positively linked to the dependent variable and 
statistically significant. Therefore, it can be gathered that in the presence of denser 
networks, the chances of a social networks being used as an alternative governance 
mechanism are higher. On a similar note, stronger ties among network members are more 
likely to encourage group members to use their social network for resolving disputes.  
Since a traditional R square does not exist for binary models as opposed to the 
OLS models, many attempts have been made by econometricians to create a Pseudo R 
square. In the second model, a Pseudo R square, McFadden R square is used, which is a 
popular choice among econometricians. A McFadden value between 0.2-0.4 is highly 
desirable and considered a good fit. The McFadden value for our model is 0.48 which 
suggests that the model is a reasonably good fit. 
 
3.3. Comparison of LPM and Binary Logistic Models 
As discussed earlier, Binary Logistic models are the more preferred choice of 
technique in case of binary depend variables because it gives reliable results. In OLS, 
there is no constraint that the predicted values of Y estimates fall in the 0-1 range; indeed, 
predicted Y is free to vary between negative infinity and positive infinity and therefore it 
would violate the linearity assumption of OLS. LPM comes with certain restrictions 
[Gujarati (2012); Maddala and Lahiri (1992)]. Some of the limitations of LPM are 
presence of heteroscedasticity, possible violation of linearity assumption and error terms 
which are not normally distributed [Gujarati (2012)]. However, before the advent of 
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computer applications, which have made calculating binary response models very easy, 
the LPM was widely used due to its simplicity [Gujarati (2012)]. 
In the case of our results, though the hypotheses have been supported or the 
relationships have been established between dependent and independent variables.  
The conclusion of the results is that both LPM and BLM in our case do not give 
contradictory results and move in the same direction in terms of significance of variables.  
 
4. REFLECTIONS AND DISCUSSION 
The results of this empirical study support the hypotheses proposed in the study. It 
was clear that entrepreneurs solely rely on networking for almost all aspects that they were 
questioned about. The family run businesses dominate the industry in Faisalabad and nearly 
all segments of the value chain are related to each other in some way [Khan (2011)]. Since, 
most of the cluster is dominated by  few families; nearly everyone is related to each other in 
way or the other. The peer pressures created by such an environment guarantees that 
contract are honoured and there is a very little reliance on formal dispute resolving 
institutions [Khan and Ghani (2004); Nicholas and Maitland (2007)].  
The society‘s features of trust and reciprocity have made it possible that small 
loans are taken out from other businesses without the need for any written contract. Such 
informal institutions bring efficiency in the economic process and reduce uncertainty 
[Nicholas and Maitland (2007)].  The power of informal institutions in reducing 
transaction costs cannot be matched by the formal mechanisms of dispute resolution 
(courts) and provision of credit (banks and other formal financial institutions). Many 
businessmen would find the formal institutions unnecessary and tedious. Moreover, the 
embedded institutions of trust and reputation in social circles help in reducing uncertainty 
to providing an environment where economic agents can come together and assume risks.  
Social sanction and market limitations are the most common instruments for the 
enforcement of contracts and the recovery of loans. Recourse to the legal system of the 
country is uncommon since such financing is by its very nature conducted without 
reference to the legal system. The informal institution of reciprocity and trust are so 
firmly embedded in the business networks that there is hardly any need for formal 
regulations for ensuring that contracts would be honoured.  
 
4.1. Conclusions 
The presence of a social network would not necessarily lead to reduction in transaction 
costs; rather it is the structure of the social network that would establish that. This conclusion 
can perhaps explain the differences that occur in regional business growth, despite having 
similar policies and financial circumstances. Lastly, this study paves room for further 
investigation in the nature of networks other than density which makes them more useful for 
businesses. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the deeper characteristics of the 
social networks, but it can stimulate further research in this direction.  
 
4.2. Policy Lessons 
It has been observed that social network of the entrepreneurs of SMEs has been 
beneficial in reducing the transaction costs associated with conducting business by acting 
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as an alternative governance mechanism that ensures contracts are honoured and 
providing the information on credibility of partners. Thus, an environment with higher 
levels of trust that promotes social capital would be conducive for promotion and growth 
of businesses. There are various channels through which public policies can be helpful in 
creation and support of high trust environment. Through conscious public policy 
measures, the use of tools and ideas can create a sense of solidarity, collectiveness and 
citizenship which has an important effect on social trust, in the way of creating the idea 
of interdependency between all actors of a society instead of a social imaginary built on 
self-preservation.  
In the case of Pakistan in particular, policies which can directly impact social 
interaction of citizens are those which target spaces of public discourse are housing and 
social composition of schools. Education policies which target reducing segregation on 
the basis of faith, income and ethnicity and so forth can lead to feelings of unity and 
solidarity among the citizens and thus create opportunities for accumulation of social 
capital.  
Similarly, housing policies in Pakistan governing spatial equality, which minimise 
segregation based on income levels would lead to building solidarity and developing 
empathy for others. Such policies are especially important for heterogeneous societies 
like Pakistan.  
In Pakistan, strengthening of local bodies can be an effective public policy tool as 
well to engage the social capital at grass roots level in formal decision making.  
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